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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995 with the 
purpose of extending trade disciplines to services and intellectual property 
rights.  To ensure the efficacy of the realization of this objective, it was 
necessary to ensure that the organization has a broad membership.  In the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) period (1947–1995), the 
membership was small and consisted mostly of Western developed countries, 
a “gentlemen’s club” of trading nations.  The new WTO Agreements are 
important to ensure trading opportunities for the old club members in 
developing countries. Possibly even more important in ensuring a wide 
membership for the WTO is guaranteeing the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights on newly industrialised or industrialising countries mostly in 
Asia. 
Attracting countries into the WTO was done by forecasting not only trade 
opportunities but also by promising a fairer trading system, ensuring the 
system would promote sustainable development and that positive efforts 
would be made for developing countries. 
The dispute settlement system is a crucial element in the realization of the 
hopes of the WTO members and the realization of the organization’s 
objective.  This Article will review the failure of the system to live up to the 
high hopes that were created at the inauguration of the system as well as the 
proposed improvements. 
II.  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
The position of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement 
system is ambivalent.1  Their position is procedurally better than in the 
GATT period because the WTO is a rule-based system and not a power-
based system.2  It is generally accepted that a rule-based system with a quasi-
judicial dispute settlement system serves the interests of developing 
                                                                                                                   
 1 GARY P. SAMPSON & W. BRADNEE CHAMBERS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: 
POLICY APPROACHES (2008), available at http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/sample-chapters/de 
veloping_countries_and_the_WTO_web.pdf (“WTO law suffers from the same ambivalence 
as WTO politics.”). 
 2 It is important to note that only a small number of developing countries were GATT 
contracting parties.  Most functioned outside the system and were therefore free to engage in 
protectionist, trade-restricting, and import-substituting policies.  See generally Olu Fasan, 
Global Trade Law: Challenges and Options for Africa, 47 J. AFR. L. 143 (2003) (discussing 
the imbalance in the WTO and how the imbalance can be dealt with so that less wealthy 
countries can take advantage of a rules-based system). 
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countries, least-developed countries (LDCs) and small economies better.3  
Renato Ruggiero, first Director-General of the WTO, declared that the 
dispute settlement system is “an important guarantee of fair trade for middle-
sized exporting nations.”4 
But developing countries have been among the most vocal critics of the 
dispute settlement system.  Their confidence was already shattered by what 
has been described as the betrayal of the Uruguay Round and the disregard of 
their interests in the Sutherland report.5  As developing countries face an 
increasingly independent and activist dispute settlement system enforcing a 
substantive body of rules that they regard as biased against them, most 
developing countries have become more fearful of the system and its 
consequences.6  The African Group sharply notes that “in their interpretation 
and application of the provisions, the panels and the Appellate Body have in 
several instances exceeded their mandate and fundamentally prejudiced the 
interests and rights of developing-country Members as enshrined in the WTO 
Agreement.”7  Fasan writes that developing countries have become hostage 
to the quasi-judicial enforcement of skewed rules.8  
An impartial dispute settlement system based on legal rules may be more 
advantageous to developing countries but it would be naive to assert that the 
WTO is based on rules only and not on power.9  Empirical analysis suggests 
that the system still reflects power-based relationships.10  The Quad 
Countries (EU, U.S., Canada, and Japan) gain more out of the dispute 
settlement system because they can afford to employ a full-time team to 
                                                                                                                   
 3 See John Whalley, Developing Countries and System Strengthening in the Uruguay 
Round, in  THE URUGUAY ROUND AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 409 (Will Martin & L. Alan 
Winters eds., 1996); James Smith, Inequality in International Trade? Developing Countries 
and Institutional Change in WTO Dispute Settlement, 11 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 543 (2004) 
(“Conventional wisdom suggests that moves to establish binding, third party arbitration in 
international law generally favor smaller, less powerful states.”).  
 4 Renato Ruggiero, Dir. Gen., WTO, Address to the Korean Business Association (Apr. 
17, 1977), available at http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/sprr_e/seoul_e.htm. 
 5 See Donald McRae, Developing Countries and “the Future of the WTO,” 8 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 603 (2005) (“The Uruguay Round is often portrayed as a betrayal.  Developing 
Countries agreed to TRIPS in exchange for a liberalization of agricultural and other trade that 
never eventuated.”). 
 6 See generally Fasan, supra note 2 (discussing developments in the wake of the 1994 
Uruguay Round). 
 7 Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Proposal by the African Group, 
para. 2, TN/DS/W/15 (Sept. 15, 2002) [hereinafter African Group Proposal]. 
 8 Fasan, supra note 2, at 162. 
 9 Asif H. Qureshi, Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO, 47 J. AFR. L. 174–75 
(2003). 
 10 See Peter Holmes et al., Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement: Back to GATT? 
(World Bank Policy Research Paper, N° 3133, 2003).   
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monitor the reports, to safeguards their rights, and to enforce their 
entitlements.  It is commentators from those countries that are most hostile to 
strengthening procedural advantages for developing countries and LDCs.11  
The current procedural set-up ostensibly based on sovereign equality hides a 
weighted voting system that entrenches real power in the hands of the few.12  
This “organised hypocrisy in the procedural context” serves them well and is 
safeguarded by their resistance to meaningful change.13  Only a minority of 
developing countries can benefit from the system. Countries like Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, China, India, Mexico, South-Africa, and Thailand are well 
placed to use the system to their advantage.  These countries are atypical 
developing countries and are better classified as emerging economies.14  
Most developing countries and all LDCs can be only be disappointed in 
the system despite it being heralded as one of the great success stories.15  The 
African Group, of which thirty-four members are LDCs, formulates it 
succinctly: “Experience has shown that the [dispute settlement system] has 
not satisfactorily and clearly aimed in its operation to contribute towards the 
tangible attainment of the development objectives of the WTO 
Agreement.”16  Who could disagree with former Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpakdi’s understated observation that “[for] all its virtues, . . . [the] 
system is not perfect”?17  Many developing countries, and especially LDCs, 
cannot afford to mount a serious defense if they are facing a claim; let alone 
identify and prepare a case.18  Only one case has ever been brought by an 
LDC and not a single panellist from an LDC has been appointed.19  This 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Ignacio Garcia-Bercero & Paolo Garzotti, DSU Reform: What Are the Underlying 
Issues?, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 123, 146 
(Dencho Georgiev & Kim Van der Borght eds., 2006). 
 12 See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 342 (2002). 
 13 Id. 
 14 See Mohan Kumar, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Developing Country Participation 
and Possible Reform, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 177, 182. 
 15 See Supachai Panitchpakdi, Foreword, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 9, 9; Kumar, supra note 14, at 179–80.  For 
statistics on participation of developing countries and LDCs, see Qureshi, supra note 9, at 
173; Pretty Elizabeth Kuruvila, Developing Countries and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 171, 203 (1997); CONSTANTINE MICHALOPOULOS, 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO 167 (2001). 
 16 African Group Proposal, supra note 7, at 1. 
 17 See Panitchpakdi, supra note 15, at 9–10. 
 18 See Amin Alavi, African Countries and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 25 
DEV. POL. REV. 25, 31–32 (2007) (noting the problem of “the rising cost of initiating litigation, 
which many countries are not able to afford”). 
 19 Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS 306; India – Anti-Dumping Measure on Batteries from 
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unbalanced representation in panels and the Appellate Body was noted with 
concern by the African Group that stressed that a “balanced geographical 
representation will assist in promoting a balanced [dispute settlement] that 
reflects the various backgrounds and inherent concerns of the entire WTO 
membership.”20  
A few developing countries have used the opportunities offered by 
intervening in dispute settlement procedures.21  India and China, for 
example, actively use the third party intervention to learn the process and 
train their diplomats to be better prepared.  Any developing country that has 
the human capacity to be so involved, even if only to observe the 
proceedings as a passive observer without filing written submissions, would 
be well advised to make use of this learning opportunity.22  But again, this 
opportunity reveals an important difference in the level of engagement of 
developing countries and the main players in the system.  The EU and the 
U.S., as a matter of strategy, declare a third party interest in almost every 
Appellate Body Proceeding that they are not involved in as a disputant.23  
The Appellate Body actively encourages such third party participation and 
takes care to glean their views and opinions.24  It is, for the small number of 
countries that can afford to be actively involved in every case, a valuable 
opportunity to give direction to the reasoning of the Appellate Body and by 
extension to the direction of WTO law. 
Access to justice is thus a genuine issue for many WTO members to such 
an extent that it brings the legitimacy of the system in question if it not 
forcefully addressed.  Hence, the system demands structural and substantive 
reforms to address this if the system wants to remain credible for all WTO 
members.25  Indeed, the African Group states:  
                                                                                                                   
Bangladesh, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds 
306_e.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011); Dispute Settlement Body, Diagnosis of the Problems 
Affecting the Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Some Ideas by Mexico, at 4, TN/DS/90 (July 16, 
2007); Victor Mosoti, Africa in the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 427, 440 (2006). 
 20 African Group Proposal, supra note 7, at 6.  For a chart of the participation of African 
countries in panels and the Appellate Body, see Mosoti, supra note 19, at 440. 
 21 Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing 
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in INT’L CTR. TRADE & 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM IN 
THE WTO 1, 14 (Victor Mosoti ed., 2003). 
 22 See Smith, supra note 3, at 554 (explaining that the Appellate Body created the passive 
observer category to make it easier for developing countries to participate). 
 23 Id. at 561. 
 24 Shaffer, supra note 21, at 10–13. 
 25 Proposal by the LDC Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
TN/DS/W/7 (Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter LDC Group Proposal]. 
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It should be clearly affirmed, that the DS [dispute settlement] is 
not just about expedition or speed, it is also about real justice to 
all Members; and that the DS must be part of the mechanisms 
for attaining the development objectives of the WTO as an 
institution.  Its success should be equally determined on the 
basis of the extent to which findings and recommendations 
fully reflect and promote the development objectives.26 
III.  DEVELOPING COUNTRY PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
The awareness of their precarious position has led developing countries to 
formulate proposals that are simultaneously defensive, attempting to restrict 
the progressive strengthening of the system, and combative, fighting to 
improve their own interests in the system.  These include proposals to 
overcome the lack of expertise and experience in the system or to address the 
cost of acquiring such expertise and proposals to improve the special and 
differential treatment provisions.  Both these sets of proposals are discussed 
in this section.  Other proposals, such as those aimed at turning back some of 
the developments introduced by the Appellate Body and supported by 
developed countries and the proposals to change the system of enforcement 
are discussed in the relevant sections. 
The lack of experienced personnel is a recurring issue for developing 
countries and one that is identified time and time again as a major obstacle 
for developing countries in making better use of the system.27  The proposals 
call for better training for civil servants from LDCs, financial support for 
legal assistance, and the establishment of a not-for-profit law firm.28  Some 
of these have been achieved either wholly or in part.  The technical 
assistance and training has been increased with donations from individual 
WTO members.  
Overcoming the lack of human resources by hiring private counsel proved 
an issue when St. Lucia retained counsel to represent it in the Bananas Case.  
Despite opposition from the U.S. and the EU, the Appellate Body allowed 
the use of such private counsel, stressing its particular significance to allow 
                                                                                                                   
 26 African Group Proposal, supra note 7, at 7. 
 27 See, e.g., Fabien Besson & Racem Mehdi, Is WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased 
Against Developing Countries? An Empirical Analysis 9–11 (2004) (unpublished paper 
presented at the International Conference on Policy Modeling); Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. 
Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the 
World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 205–35 (2002). 
 28 See Contribution of Jamaica to the Doha Mandated Review of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), TN/DS/W/21 (Oct. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Jamaica Contribution]. 
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full participation in dispute settlement procedures for developing countries.  
It was a useful step for developing countries but one that came with 
additional problems.  Hiring private counsel is very costly; a cost that is 
difficult to bear for developing countries. 
The Advisory Centre for WTO Law was established to provide legal 
assistance to developing countries and LDCs at reduced cost or in some 
cases pro bono.29  Support from the most powerful members of the WTO for 
this initiative is absent.  In the EU, only some Member-States supported it, 
notably The Netherlands as a driving force behind the initiative, but the EU 
as such did not support it.  Seemingly the United States, Japan, Germany, 
France and the EU collectively preferred not to assist this initiative that could 
support developing countries in litigating against their interests.30  The 
African Group stresses that the Advisory Centre should not be regarded “as a 
panacea for all institutional and human capacity constraints of developing 
countries.”31  Also, the Advisory Centre only provides a service to requesting 
developing countries with a viable case.  Identifying violations of WTO law 
and collecting pre-litigation data is beyond the Centre’s mandate and 
resources.32  For most LDCs this proves a hurdle that is insurmountable.  
Many developing countries are, moreover, not a member of the Advisory 
Centre or perceive having the Advisory Centre as sole provider of subsidised 
legal support as unfair.33 
Brown and Hoekman have proposed public-private partnerships to bring 
what they term the ‘missing cases’ to the WTO.34  These are cases that have 
not been litigated by developing countries because of the costs associated 
with WTO litigation.  They propose harnessing private interests to engage 
with the public sector to identify cases, bring them before the WTO dispute 
settlement system, and generate public and political support to remove the 
offending measures.  Potential private partners that are identified, include 
international law firms, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  It is 
suggested that international law firms can be motivated to offer pro bono 
services to developing countries for self-interested reasons as well as 
altruistic reasons.35  Neither offers a convincing argument why international 
                                                                                                                   
 29 See Kim Van der Borght, The Advisory Center on WTO Law: Advancing Fairness and 
Equality, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 723–28 (1999). 
 30 Id.; Smith, supra note 3, at 567; Chad. P. Brown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute 
Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 875 (2005). 
 31 African Group Proposal, supra note 7, at 2. 
 32 Brown & Hoekman, supra note 30, at 875. 
 33 Garcia-Bercero & Garzotti, supra note 11, at 147. 
 34 Brown & Hoekman, supra note 30, at 861. 
 35 Id. at 877–80. 
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law firms would offer a structural solution to the lack of human and financial 
resources of developing countries.  This does not diminish the fruitful 
cooperation that can arise in those fortuitous cases where the interests of 
these law firms and the developing countries seeking their services coincide.  
Similar problems are associated with issue-based NGOs.  Such NGOs may 
have an interest in being engaged more directly in WTO litigation to further 
their agenda, but as Brown and Hoekman themselves rightly observe, “the 
action of an NGO may not be aligned with the interest of the developing 
country that is being used as the vehicle to publicly air the NGO’s issue.”36  
Some proposals from developing countries outline methods such as the 
setting up a Dispute Settlement Fund to improve access to justice by 
integrating the cost of the procedure, including legal fees and costs of 
experts, in the system.37  As the proposal of the African Group summarizes 
it: “Every decent legal system ensures that parties that would not be able to 
exercise their rights in the judicial system for financial constraints are 
provided means to do so.”38  
All these proposals aim at reducing the cost of litigation for developing 
countries in the dispute settlement system as it exists.  But proposals have 
also been brought to change the system itself either by internalizing the cost 
of litigation or by recognizing the difference between the Members.39 
India and China have proposed that if a developing country prevails in a 
case against a developed country, the developing country should recover its 
litigation costs.40  It should not be surprising that EU commentators are 
rather hostile to such proposals and refer to increased futile litigation, which 
risks overthrowing “the delicate balance between ‘political’ and ‘quasi-
judicial’ arms of the WTO.”41  They only see as merit in exploring some 
compensation for a reasonable amount of expenses incurred by an LDC 
when a developed country is found in violation of WTO commitments in a 
case brought by an LDC.42  As observed earlier, no case has ever been 
brought by an LDC. 
Justice for all WTO members requires that the system is not blind for the 
differences of its members. The WTO Agreements contain several provisions 
on Special and Differential (S&D) treatment that recognise the different 
                                                                                                                   
 36 Id. at 882 n.37. 
 37 See Jamaica Contribution, supra note 28, at 3–4; African Group Proposal, supra note 7, 
at 4. 
 38 African Group Proposal, supra note 7, at 2. 
 39 See generally WTO, South Centre, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Issues to 
Consider in the DSU Negotiations, TRADE Analysis Doc. SC/TADT/TA/DS/1 (Oct. 2005). 
 40 See Garcia-Bercero & Garzotti, supra note 11, at 148. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
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position of some WTO members, but these provisions have proved less than 
effective as developing countries and LDCs are reluctant to call upon them 
as it brings their weaker position into sharp focus.43  It reduces their position 
of sovereign equals by tainting their rights with notions of charity.44  It also 
raises the fear that when they prevail in the proceedings, it will reduce the 
normative force of the ruling.45  Whereas the overall procedure is 
characterised by a high level of automaticity, several S&D provisions are not 
activated automatically when relevant.  
The scepticism and frustration of developing countries with special and 
differential treatment is shared by the Sutherland report. It calls into question 
the wisdom of such discrimination but acknowledges it as a valid concept 
because it is part of the GATT acquis.46  Since S&D measures are likely to 
remain a political demand, the WTO should do more to make these measures 
effective. 
The effectiveness of existing S&D provisions was questioned by the LDC 
Group with regard to Article 12.11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) that compels a panel to explicitly indicate the form in which the S&D 
rules have been taken into account.  But these provisions must be activated 
by the developing country by pointing out the relevant S&D to the panel.  
Similarly, Article 8.10 DSU allows a developing country to request the 
appointment of a developing country panellist.  LDCs reject the burden 
imposed on developing countries and LDCs to raise these S&D provisions on 
the basis of the adage jura novit curiae—the court knows the law.  The 
application of such provisions should therefore not depend on a trigger from 
developing countries or LDCs but it should be an obligation on panels and 
the Appellate Body to respect these provisions to the full without a need 
request their application.47 
Jamaica argues for an effective implementation of Article 21.8 DSU that 
provides that if a case is brought by a developing country, “The DSB 
[Dispute Settlement Body] shall take into account not only the trade 
coverage of measures complained of but also their impact on the economy of 
developing-country member concerned.”48  
                                                                                                                   
 43 Alavi, supra note 18, at 33. 
 44 See Qureshi, supra note 9, at 194. 
 45 See FRIEDER ROESSLER, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES UNDER THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (2005). 
 46 McRae, supra note 5, at 604. 
 47 LDC Group Proposal, supra note 25, at 2. 
 48 Jamaica Contribution, supra note 28, at 7. 
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 The proposal extends this provision to cases that are brought against a 
developing country.49  The method of implementation should, according to 
the Jamaican proposal, be addressed in the panel or Appellate Body report.50  
Gradually, a more pernicious concern has entered the public debate 
concerning the limited participation of developing countries in the dispute 
settlement system.  The main trading powers have a hold over developing 
countries through other agreements and arrangements, not in the least 
development assistance and preferential arrangement outside the WTO 
system. For developing countries, and especially for LDCs, this support can 
represent an important economic factor in their foreign policy.  It can 
influence their position in trade negotiations, in consultations, in the decision 
to request a panel, in the decision to request to activation of S&D measures 
and in the feasibility of using retaliation in the event the developing country 
prevails in dispute settlement proceedings.  The empirical study by Zejan and 
Bartels suggests a significant relationship between the initiation of disputes 
by developing countries and aid they receive.51  They suggest that self-
censorship may be operating on the part of developing countries.52 
IV.  THE PRIMITIVE REMEDIES OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ARE ONLY 
FOR THE STRONG MEMBERS 
Disputing parties are bound by the report of a panel or the Appellate 
Body once it is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), a procedural 
step that is largely a legal fiction as it occurs automatically (reversed 
consensus rule).  The parties are then expected to comply promptly with the 
recommendations and rulings contained in the adopted report.53  The first 
objective of an adopted report is always the withdrawal of the measure found 
to be inconsistent with the WTO Agreements.54  If immediate 
implementation is not practical, the DSU provides for a reasonable period of 
time to achieve implementation.55  This period of time has to be approved by 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Id. 
 50 Id.  
 51 See Pilar Zejan & Frank L. Bartels, Be Nice and Get Your Money — An Empirical 
Analysis of World Trade Organization Trade Disputes and Aid, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 1021–47 
(2006). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226, art. 21.1 (1994) [hereinafter 
DSU]. 
 54 Id. art. 3.7. 
 55 Id. art. 21.3. 
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the DSB and can either be determined on the basis of a proposal by the 
member concerned, or it can be the time agreed by the parties.56  Failing to 
reach agreement, the issue is be decided by arbitration.57  The reasonable 
period of time should not exceed fifteen months.58  
However, if the measure at issue is not withdrawn voluntarily, the DSU 
contains several measures to coerce the party to comply with the report by 
bringing its regulation in line with WTO Agreements.  First, the parties can 
agree on trade compensation.59  This trade compensation takes the form of 
additional trade advantages but it is a voluntary agreement and cannot be 
demanded as of right.60  The use of compensation is further complicated by 
the rules of the DSU that are not supportive of using compensation.  If trade 
compensation is agreed, this additional market access is not limited to the 
complaining party but is multilateralized to the entire WTO membership.  
Such compensation is, moreover, unlikely to benefit the industry that was 
directly affected by the contested measure.  Especially in those cases where 
this industry was the driving force and in some cases the financial backer of 
the complaint, it would be politically impossible to agree on compensation 
that does not reflect their interests.61  The difficulties in using trade 
compensation have meant that it has only been used once and is not a 
realistic option in the current system.62  To use trade compensation, the 
complaining party first has to request retaliation as this procedure will lead 
into Article 22.6 DSU to ascertain the level of nullification and impairment.  
Clearly these procedures would need to be disentangled for compensation to 
become a more realistic option. The EU proposes that arbitration to 
determine the level of nullification and impairment should be made possible 
before the request for authorisation to retaliate.63  
The remedy of last resort in WTO dispute settlement is the suspension of 
concessions or other obligations, in short, retaliation.  Retaliatory measures 
can only be taken when authorised by the DSB.64  The level of the 
suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB has to 
be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.65  The retaliation 
                                                                                                                   
 56 Id. art. 21.3(a)–(b). 
 57 Id. art. 21.3(c). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. arts. 3.7, 22.2. 
 60 See id. art. 3.7 (stating that compensation can occur only after the DSB gives 
authorization based on member’s request). 
 61 See Garcia-Bercero & Garzotti, supra note 11, at 143. 
 62 See EU Contribution 4 (informal working paper) (on file with the author). 
 63 Id. at 5. 
 64 DSU, supra note 53, art. 3.7. 
 65 Id. art. 22.4. 
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is temporary and can only be maintained until the inconsistent measure has 
been removed.66  The requesting party submits a list of measures it proposes 
to take to the DSB.  If the responding party objects to the proposed level of 
suspension, the issue is submitted to the original panel or, if that is not 
possible, to an arbitrator appointed by the Director-General.67  The arbitrator 
will estimate the level of impairment as the basis for determining the 
appropriate level of suspension of concessions.68 
Retaliation as a method of enforcement lacks the legitimacy that the 
system as a whole attempts to achieve.69  First, it contravenes the objectives 
of the WTO Agreements as it does not promote predictability, a basic 
principle of the system.70  Perhaps even more importantly, it leads to a 
restriction of international trade.  It would be more constructive and more in 
line with the WTO objectives to accord additional trade advantages to the 
prevailing party rather than denying trade advantages to the party that has 
contravened the WTO Agreements (compulsory trade compensation).71  The 
current system is, moreover, inappropriate in cases where the prevailing 
party is economically much weaker as the retaliation will resort little or no 
effect and is likely to harm the winning party economically.72  Most WTO 
members are developing countries that cannot effectively use retaliation.  
The system therefore leaves most WTO members without recourse to 
enforceable justice.  It also makes short shrift of one panel’s assertion that 
“carrying a big stick is, in many cases, as effective a means to having one’s 
way as actually using the stick.”73  True as it may be that authorisation to 
suspend concessions and other obligations was granted in only 2% of cases, 
the “dread factor” is only one part of the explanation.74  The dread factor 
emanating from a threat with retaliation from an LDC and from many 
                                                                                                                   
 66 Id. art. 22.8. 
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developing countries could be more accurately described as carrying a blunt 
toothpick.  
A further problem with the current system is the prospective nature of 
retaliations and compensation.  The prospective nature of remedies is an 
inheritance from GATT where it was unsuccessfully challenged in 1965.75  
The forward-looking remedies leave the system open to abuse by 
opportunistic WTO members who can maintain WTO inconsistent protection 
for their domestic industry for almost three years without the economic cost 
of such protectionism ever being presented to them.  After all, a party 
complaining about a measure will easily have to wait thirty-two to thirty-five 
months for relief through the dispute settlement system’s panel and 
Appellate procedures and the expiry of the reasonable period of time.76  If the 
measure after this period has not been withdrawn, it will take another 200 
days to obtain a decision from the arbitrator to determine the appropriate 
level of suspension.  Worse still, if a new measure is taken that again installs 
WTO inconsistent protection; the wait is extended by 90 to 225 days before a 
panel can determine the WTO inconsistency and another 60 to 91 days for 
the Appellate Body to confirm it.77  In the worst case scenario, it can take 
three to four and a half years to arrive at a decision that allows the 
compensation or the suspension of concessions.  During these years, the 
contested measure can be maintained and the economic harm mounts—
economic harm that can be difficult to recover from for economically weaker 
members.  It is perhaps one of the reasons why developed countries maintain 
their measures until they are found to be inconsistent by a panel or the 
Appellate Body twice as often as developing countries?78  
A limited form of relief could consist of interim measures or preventive 
measures.  Such measures can bridge the time it takes to come to a final 
decision and thereby avoid irreparable damage. The Mexican proposal 
envisages the complaining party establishing at the outset of the procedure 
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that the contested measure is causing irreparable damage and proposing 
remedies to limit the harm.  If the panel supports the argumentation of the 
complaining party, damage-limitation measures would be taken within 30 
days by the responding party.  Failing that, the complaining party would be 
authorised to take such measures.  These measures would be in place for the 
duration of the dispute settlement procedure until the DSB terminates them 
or until authorisation for retaliatory measures is granted. 
An interesting development in this respect occurred in Article 21.5 DSU 
Panel in Australia — Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of 
Automotive Leather.79  In this case, the panel decided that retroactive and 
even punitive sanctions are possible in the WTO and based this conclusion 
on the Vienna Convention on Treaties and the effectiveness of sanctions.80  
The case was terminated after the parties reached a compromise and was not 
later scrutinized by the DSB even after several WTO members objected to 
retroactive sanctions as being contrary to the “intention of the drafters” of 
Article 19 DSU.81  Australia condemned the decision as “judicial 
adventurism” going beyond what is permissible under the DSU.82  The U.S. 
similarly stressed that it did not “agree with every word of the panel report” 
and that the panel’s remedy went beyond what they had sought.83  The 
decision of the panel nevertheless has merit as it puts a stop to the “hit-and-
run” abuses that the current system is open to and because it could provide 
for compensation that better reflects the real harm done.84 
The prospective nature of the enforcement mechanism has been criticised 
in many of the reform proposals.85  Mexico has proposed to determine the 
appropriate level of retaliation through arbitration from the moment the panel 
report is circulated to all WTO members prior to the adoption by the DSB.  
Retaliation could then be implemented from the moment of adoption.  A less 
radical alternative would be to start the arbitration process immediately 
following the adoption of the report.  The level of retaliation could moreover 
be determined retrospectively from the moment the contested measure was 
taken, the moment the request for consultation was notified to the DSB or the 
moment the panel was established.  Such retrospective determination would 
constitute a shift in the relations between the parties.  Currently, any delay 
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favors the responding party.  By introducing retrospective determination of 
the level of retaliation, the magnitude of the retaliation increases, and 
therefore the risk to the responding party increases.  This shift would 
promote a speedy resolution of the conflict and would diminish the risk of 
abuse of the procedure. 
Other proposals include collective retaliation, whereby several WTO 
members would support the prevailing party in its retaliation, and negotiable 
remedies that would create a market in retaliation rights.86  Neither of these 
proposals is likely to find sufficient support among WTO members.  They 
constitute a valuable intellectual exercise to reveal problems and possibilities 
rather than a serious option for the future of WTO remedies.  
Collective retaliation was first proposed in GATT as part of the 1965 
developing country proposals.87  Developing countries rejected the system of 
bilateral retaliation as unfair and ineffective for developing countries.  They 
argued that collective retaliation whereby several developing countries 
together could retaliate against a develop country member would yield more 
results as it would have a greater economic impact.  As level of retaliation is 
supposed to reflect the level of economic harm; such collective retaliation 
would surmount this level and would in fact be punitive.88  Developing 
countries argued that the economic harm of GATT’s inconsistent measures 
had a greater impact on their economies because having their access to 
developed markets being restricted removes a potential for large growth on 
such markets.  The punitive element of collective retaliation was thus 
described as a “development multiplier.”89  
These ideas and their motivation have been revived in the current 
proposal for the reform of WTO remedies.  The African Group reiterated that 
retaliation is not a practical remedy for individual developing country 
Members to use against developed country Members.90  If they did, they 
could suffer further economic damage themselves.91  The African Group 
concludes that “this handicap of developing-country members means that the 
system is skewed against them.”92  In the LDC Group proposal, the principle 
of collective responsibility is advanced to multilateralize the right and 
responsibility to enforce the recommendations of the DSB.93  It envisages, as 
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a matter of special and differential treatment, that in cases where developing 
or LDC members successfully pursued a claim, collective retaliation should 
be automatically available.94  The proposal also retains the punitive elements 
as it continues stating that the DSB should not be constrained by 
quantification on the basis of the rule on nullification and impairment.95  The 
African proposal would authorise all WTO members to retaliate collectively 
against a developed member that adopts measures in breach of WTO 
obligations against a developing member.96  The proposal contains a similar 
increase of the level of retaliation beyond the equivalent level of nullification 
and impairment of benefits.97 
The proposal to create negotiable remedies would see the creation of a 
market in tradable retaliation rights.98  In such a system, a prevailing party 
could decide to retaliate or to convert its retaliation rights into financial 
means to compensate it for the economic damage suffered by selling its 
rights to another WTO member that would get access to temporary 
protection of its market.99  
It is, however, financial compensation that has attracted most attention in 
diplomatic as well as academic discussions. The LDC Group has expressed 
itself in favor of such compensation, adding that such remedy should be 
collectively exercised according to the United Nations model.100  The 
sanction would be taken by all WTO members.  If the prevailing nation is a 
developing country or LDC, the collective sanction would be instituted as a 
right at the simple request of the developing country or LDC.101  The African 
Group proposal also envisages financial compensation, especially to cover 
the period until the withdrawal of the measures in breach of WTO 
obligations.102  This compensation would not constitute an alternative to the 
withdrawal of inconsistent measures.103  
Bronckers and Van den Broek suggest that developing countries should 
opt for financial compensation as the preferred improvement to the remedies 
conundrum rather than continuing to support various options that are 
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unlikely to yield a diplomatic consensus.104  Among the advantages of 
financial compensation—and contrary to retaliation—is the fact that 
financial compensation does not entail a restriction to international trade.  
Financial compensation also avoids targeting innocent victims: economic 
sectors in the WTO member country that has maintained a WTO inconsistent 
measure that have no link to the dispute but are targeted by retaliation.  There 
is no reason to assume that financial compensation would be less efficient in 
achieving compliance with the WTO Agreements; it seems certainly more 
likely to be effective when a developing country or LDC prevails in a dispute 
against a developed country.  
The prospect of introducing financial compensation has already elicited 
criticism.  Financial compensation would be a fundamental change in the 
system by moving away from enshrining a balance of interests as the central 
plank of the WTO and placing the rule of law firmly at the centre of the 
organisation thus creating legal certainty for individuals and companies 
involved in international trade.  Furthermore, financial compensation can be 
directed at the companies that actually suffer the economic damage by 
having their export opportunities curtailed by WTO inconsistent measures.  
Bronckers and Van den Broek argue that financial compensation is in line 
with the preambular language of the Marrakesh Agreement extolling as the 
WTO objectives: “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and 
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 
and expanding the production of goods and services.”105  They argue that 
“the engine for such economic growth is fuelled by private activity, and the 
WTO obligations generally limit government’s interference with this 
activity.”106  The panel in US – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 
similarly emphasised that: 
Many of the benefits to Members which are meant to flow as a 
result of the acceptance of various disciplines under the 
GATT/WTO depend on the activity of individual economic 
operators in the national and global market places.  The 
purpose of many of these disciplines, indeed one of the primary 
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objects of the GATT/WTO as a whole, is to produce certain 
market conditions which would allow this individual activity to 
flourish.107 
Though individual economic actors are mostly responsible for the 
realisation of the trade opportunities created in the framework of the WTO, 
the overwhelming majority of its members are hostile to any move away 
from its governmental character or to allowing their individual or corporate 
citizens using the WTO Agreements in domestic actions.108  When the idea 
of financial compensation was first discussed in 1965, developing countries 
were unambiguous in their proposal.  Financial compensation would not 
serve to compensate private interests but would support the government’s 
development programme.109  It seems this attitude has not changed but it is 
noteworthy that the African proposal—that is supportive of some forms of 
monetary compensation—refers to the interests and injury suffered by 
industries of developing-country members.110 
Some fears have been raised that financial compensation would open the 
door for industrial countries to use it as an alternative to implementing the 
ruling and recommendation of adopted reports and keeping their inconsistent 
measures in place.  But this argument is equally valid for retaliation where 
some countries seem to assume that “paying the price”; in casu bearing the 
cost of retaliation is equivalent to complying with the decision.  It should be 
clear that this is not a matter of choice.  Adopted reports have to be 
implemented promptly, paying the price in the form of financial 
compensation or bearing the cost of retaliation is not an equivalent 
alternative.  
A further concern is that being forced to pay financial compensation 
would be a bitter blow for developing countries and LDCs.  None of the 
proposals from developing countries or LDCs include an obligation on 
themselves to be forced to pay financial compensation.  The proposal is 
always asymmetrical.  Bronckers and Van den Broek recognise the problem 
but rather suggest a solution that maintains symmetry. In this scenario, LDCs 
would be temporarily exempted from having to pay financial compensation 
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and developing countries would have the choice not to pay financial 
compensation but would then also not have the right to request financial 
compensation.111  A special S&D rule is further proposed whereby 
developing countries could be exempted from having to pay financial 
compensation in a specific case on the basis of a reasoned request.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The procedure of dispute settlement in the WTO has been described as 
the crown jewel of the organisation largely for its judicial features.  The 
system has compulsory jurisdiction and enforcement measures. But the 
judicial nature of the system is in question in the review process.  
Determining the future direction of the system will depend on whether the 
members support a mature judicial system or prefer to keep diplomatic 
control.  The current U.S. administration is supportive of a strong, 
transparent dispute settlement procedure as long as they can opt to ignore its 
outcome by “paying the price.”  This is a highly objectionable position as it 
does not promote the rule of law in international economic relations and 
reinforces the view of developing countries that the system is skewed against 
them. 
Developing countries often oppose a strengthening of the judicial nature 
as they want to maintain the WTO as an intergovernmental organisation 
whose decisionmaking procedures in dispute settlement should not be overly 
transparent.  This is an unfortunate view as transparency could highlight the 
questionable legitimacy of the substantive rules of the organisation.  It would 
be hard to argue that the WTO pursues substantive justice for all its 
members.  In that sense, the reluctance of developing country members to 
strengthen a procedure to enforce these rules is justified.  
This dichotomy between substantive and procedural justice is the major 
challenge.  Creating an exemplary dispute settlement procedure to enforce 
rules that are questionable from the point of view of developing countries 
and that, moreover, offers a qualitatively different access to justice for 
developing and industrialised countries, is a cynical exercise.  The Doha 
Development Round should address both the substantive and procedural 
concerns so that the dispute settlement system can be strengthened to support 
the rule of law for the benefit of all WTO members.  At present, such a move 
seems unlikely and the review is probably going to result in minor 
procedural improvements rather than addressing the major issues.  This will 
give rise to disappointment for developing countries—the majority of the 
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WTO membership.  It also constitutes a denial of developed countries’ 
responsibilities that form part and parcel of globalisation thereby 
endangering economic globalisation and undermining further its legitimacy 
to the detriment of all WTO members. 
